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MUTINY AGAINST THE MMPA: A 
LOOK AT ALASKA SB 60 
GARRETT BOYLE* 
ABSTRACT 
In an attempt to curb the detrimental effects of a ballooning sea otter 
population, a new bill proposed in the Alaska State Senate seeks to amend the 
Alaska fish and game statutes by placing a bounty of $100 on sea otters 
lawfully taken by Alaska Natives. This Note studies the conflicting nature of 
the proposed bill, SB 60, with the current version of the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act, examining the enforceability of the provision in light of 
precedent from the Alaska Supreme Court and a liberal interpretation of the 
MMPA. The Note ultimately concludes that SB 60, as written, is precluded 
by the MMPA and therefore unenforceable. 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 20, 2013, Senator Bert Stedman introduced Senate Bill 
60 (“SB 60”) in the Alaska State Senate.1 The bill is a proposed 
amendment to the fish and game statutes that would place a bounty on 
sea otters taken by Alaska Natives. The text of the bill states: 
The department shall pay a person $100 for each sea otter: 
(1) the person lawfully takes under 16 U.S.C. 1361–1421h 
(Marine Mammal Protection Act); and 
(2) for which the person submits proof of taking 
satisfactory to the department.2 
Both proponents and opponents of SB 60 have responded strongly. 
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 1.  ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 28th Leg., 1st Sess. 0347 (Feb. 20, 2013). 
 2.  Id. 
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The bill’s sponsor, Senator Stedman, argued with convincing evidence 
that the explosion of the sea otter population in Southeast Alaska in 
recent years has devastated the divefishing industry, resulting in 
millions of dollars of lost revenue.3 Senator Stedman represents District 
Q in the State Senate, which covers all of Southeast Alaska. The bill was 
supported by local fishermen,4 an industry group,5 and the city of Craig, 
Alaska.6 Written testimony from proponents provided anecdotal 
evidence supporting the information presented in Senator Stedman’s 
sponsor statement.7 
Opponents of the bill claim that incentivizing Native take of sea 
otters will negatively impact tourism,8 may affect salmon populations,9 
and may indirectly contribute to global warming.10 Additionally, the bill 
as currently written may be in conflict with the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act (“MMPA”)11 and thus be unenforceable. 
This Comment first introduces the legal context of SB 60. It then 
examines and interprets the MMPA, as well as some of its pertinent 
legislative history. Next follows a discussion of two Alaska Supreme 
Court cases that may affect a lower court’s interpretation of the MMPA 
in determining whether SB 60 can be legally enacted and enforced. 
Finally, this Comment discusses the potential legality of the proposed 
bounty through the lens of precedent and a liberal reading of the 
 
 3. SEN. BERT K. STEDMAN, 28TH LEG., SPONSOR STATEMENT, SB 60 – BOUNTY ON 
SEA OTTERS (Alaska 2013), available at http://www.alaskasenate.org/Docs/spons 
or_statements/SB60_sponsor_statement_stedman.pdf [hereinafter SPONSOR 
STATEMENT]; Letter from Max Worhatch to Sen. John Coghill, Jr., Alaska S. 
Judiciary Comm. (Mar. 17, 2013), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/ 
get_documents.asp?session=28&docid=6254 [hereinafter Worhatch Letter]. 
 4.  Letter from Carl Porter to Alaska S. Judiciary Comm., available at 
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_documents.asp?session=28&docid=625
6; Worhatch Letter, supra note 3. 
 5.  Letter from Kathy Hansen, Exec. Dir., Se. Alaska Fisherman’s Alliance, 
to S. Res. Comm., Alaska State Leg. (Mar. 12, 2013), available at 
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_documents.asp?session=28&docid=3592. 
 6.  City of Craig, Res. 13-06 (adopted Mar. 7, 2013), available at 
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_documents.asp?session=28&docid=3037. 
 7.  See supra notes 3–5 (describing the reasons they support SB 60). 
 8.  E-mail from Tina M. Brown, President, Alaska Wildlife Alliance, to 
Members of the Alaska State S. Res. Comm. (Mar. 13, 2013, 13:43 AKDT), 
available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_documents.asp?session=28& 
docid=3411 [hereinafter Brown Letter]. 
 9. See E-mail from Patricia O’Brien to Sen. Cathy Giessel, S. Res. Comm., 
Alaska State Leg. (Mar. 15, 2013, 11:56 AKDT), available at 
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_documents.asp?session=28&docid=3643 
(“The value of the kelp forest is not yet fully understood, but it is known that 
kelp forests are a nursery for many fin fish including salmon and rock fish.”). 
 10.  Id.; Brown Letter, supra note 8. 
 11.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1423h (2012). 
BOYLE_V14_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2013 12:32 PM 
2013 MUTINY AGAINST THE MMPA 209 
MMPA, concluding that SB 60, as currently written, is probably too 
broad to pass constitutional muster. 
I. THE BACKGROUND AND LEGAL CONTEXT OF SB 60 
This Section examines several background issues influencing the 
debate on SB 60. First, it provides a discussion of the history of the sea 
otter in Southeast Alaska, the current trends and recent history of the 
divefishing industry, and the theoretical indirect impact sea otters have 
on global warming. The Section then looks at potential legal conflicts to 
SB 60, including the MMPA’s preemption clause, the Native exemption 
to the MMPA, and Alaska precedent. 
A. The History of the Sea Otter 
The history of the sea otter in Southeast Alaska is a turbulent one. 
Alaska Natives have always harvested the otter,12 but commercial 
exploitation of otters did not begin until the arrival of Russian fur 
traders in 1741.13 It is estimated that between 500,000 and 1 million otters 
were killed for their fur between the years 1741 and 1911.14 
Consequently, otters were completely eliminated from the Southeast 
Alaska region.15 When otters were granted protection under the 
International Fur Seal Treaty of 1911,16 the commercial pressure on the 
species was greatly reduced.17 In 1965, after a fifty year absence, the 
Alaska Department of Fish and Game transplanted 412 otters from other 
areas of the state to the Southeast, where the animals were kept under 
state management.18 When the MMPA was signed into law in 1972, it 
transferred management of the sea otter from the State to the federal 
government.19 
 
 
 12.  U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., CONSERVATION PLAN FOR THE SEA OTTER IN 
ALASKA 4 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 PLAN]. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. at 7. 
 16. International Fur Seal Treaty of 1911, July 1, 1911, 37 Stat. 1542. This 
treaty has since been superseded by the Interim Convention on Conservation of 
North Pacific Fur Seals, Oct. 14, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 2284. 
 17.  See 1994 PLAN, supra note 12, at 5 (explaining that in the last 80 years the 
sea otters have “repopulated most of their former range in Alaska”). 
 18.  Id. at 5, 7. 
 19.  Id. 
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i. Sea Otter Impact on Fisheries 
 
Otters feed primarily on “sessile and slow-moving invertebrates 
such as abalone, clam, crab, mussel, and sea urchin,”20 and so the fifty 
year absence of the otters (combined with a depleted population for an 
unknown period of time prior to that absence) likely created an 
unnaturally high shellfish population in Southeast Alaska.21 Because 
otters do not have a protective layer of blubber like other marine 
mammals,22 they require a tremendous amount of food to sustain their 
high metabolism.23 In captivity, otters will consume up to 25% of their 
body weight per day.24 With males weighing between seventy and 
ninety pounds and females averaging forty to sixty pounds, a large sea 
otter population demands a large food source.25 
In 1994, the otter population in Southeast Alaska was estimated to 
be around 7,000 and growing at a rate of 20% per year.26 The Fish and 
Wildlife Service (“the Service”) recognized that “[s]ome form of 
management may be necessary or desirable to minimize sea otter 
predation on shellfish in areas where such predation might preclude 
commercial, subsistence, or recreational fisheries that have developed in 
the absence of otters.”27 However, no action was ever taken by the 
Service. 
The current population of otters in Southeast Alaska is estimated to 
be around 21,500.28 A population of that size can have potentially 
devastating effects on the local ecosystem and economy.29 For example, a 
sea otter population of 21,500 consumes approximately 127 million 
pounds of shellfish per year.30 Compare that to the commercial harvest 
 
 20.  Id. at 8. 
 21.  Id. at 3–4. 
 22.  MCDOWELL GRP., SEA OTTER IMPACTS ON COMMERCIAL FISHERIES IN 
SOUTHEAST ALASKA 8 (2011) [hereinafter MCDOWELL REPORT]. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  1994 PLAN, supra note 12, at 7. 
 27.  Id. at 22. 
 28.  SPONSOR STATEMENT, supra note 3; see also VERENA GILL, U.S. FISH & 
WILDLIFE SERVICE, SEA OTTERS IN SOUTHEAST ALASKA; THEIR CURRENT POPULATION 
STATUS & CAUSES OF MORTALITY 7 (2013), available at 
http://www.uas.alaska.edu/arts_sciences/naturalsciences/biology/sea_otter_s
ymposium/files/VerenaGill.pdf (estimating current population at between 
21,793 and 25,712). 
 29.  See SPONSOR STATEMENT, supra note 3 (stating that continued growth of 
the sea otter population “jeopardiz[es] hundreds of jobs and tens of millions of 
dollars in economic activity for the region”). 
 30.  Id. 
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for dive and Dungeness crab in 2010, which totaled only 5.9 million 
pounds―a mere 5% of the amount of potential otter consumption.31 A 
report issued in 2011 estimated the total shellfish value lost to sea otter 
predation since 1995 to be $28.3 million.32 Losses in 2011 alone were 
$2.23 million in the sea cucumber fishery, and $2.0 million in the 
geoduck clam fishery.33 
ii. Sea Otter Impact on Global Warming 
 
Opponents of SB 60 cite a study published in 2012 that links sea 
otters to a decrease in the amount of carbon in the atmosphere.34 The 
report offers convincing evidence that otters indirectly reduce global 
warming. Sea otters eat large quantities of sea urchins, which in turn 
feed on kelp.35 Because kelp has a “high rate of uptake of atmospheric 
[carbon dioxide], it stands to reason that sea otters might well increase 
the rate of [carbon] sequestration through their positive indirect effect on 
kelp.”36 This logic lends some support to the idea of a carbon credit 
market for kelp farming.37 
The report concludes that the amount of carbon sequestered 
indirectly by sea otters in the form of increased amounts of kelp is 
valued somewhere between $205 million and $408 million.38 However, 
distribution of that payout would be a regulatory nightmare, and likely 
significantly reduce the actual value received. Furthermore, there would 
be massive regulatory problems with management of the farms, 
especially with respect to precisely who would maintain the kelp forests.  
While there are many uncertainties with regards to feasibility, kelp 
farming presents an interesting alternative for residents of Southeast 
Alaska. Rather than fighting the otters for what little shellfish are 
available, a fisherman could potentially become a kelp farmer and sell 
credits on a market. This option could create jobs and money for the 
Southeast while preserving, and likely increasing, the number of otters. 
 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  MCDOWELL REPORT, supra note 22, at 1. 
 33.  Id. at 2. 
 34.  See generally Christopher C. Wilmers et al., Do Trophic Cascades Affect the 
Storage and Flux of Atmospheric Carbon? An Analysis of Sea Otters and Kelp Forests, 
10 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 409 (2012). 
 35.  Id. at 410. 
 36.  Id. 
 37. See id. at 413 (“An alluring idea would thus be to sell the [carbon] 
indirectly sequestered by the sea otter . . . .”). 
 38.  Id. 
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B. Legal Context of SB 60 
As it is currently written, there are a number of reasons why SB 60 
would likely be unenforceable. For one, the language of the bill does not 
limit the take area to the problem region of the Southeast, but rather it 
includes the entire state, which exacerbates enforcement issues. For 
instance, the Southwest otter population has declined by more than 50% 
since the mid-1980s,39 and was listed as threatened under the 
Endangered Species Act in 2005.40 Otters in this part of the state face a 
much different reality than those in the overpopulated Southeast, and SB 
60 fails to recognize this difference. 
In addition, there are problems regarding the interplay between SB 
60 and the MMPA. The remainder of this Section examines two relevant 
provisions of the MMPA and two Alaska Supreme Court cases that may 
affect how SB 60 is read in light of the MMPA. 
i. Section 1371(b): The Native Exemption 
 
Section 1371(b) of the MMPA provides an exemption to the 
moratorium on takings by Alaska Natives established in § 1371(a). The 
exemption applies to takings done “for subsistence purposes” or “for 
purposes of creating and selling authentic native articles of handicrafts 
and clothing,” so long as the taking “is not accomplished in a wasteful 
manner.”41 A legal memorandum from the Legislative Affairs Agency 
advises that “[p]roviding a bounty, and thus incentivizing the taking of 
sea otters for reasons other than subsistence and artisanal purposes, is 
likely to be interpreted as contrary to both the purposes and objectives of 
Congress in enacting the MMPA.”42 However, the exemption section can 
also be read as allowing activities that generate money necessary to live. 
Such a reading would mean there is no conflict with the language of 
section 1371(b) and the provisions of SB 60. 
 
 39.  U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., SOUTHWEST ALASKA DISTINCT POPULATION 
SEGMENT OF THE NORTHERN SEA OTTER (ENHYRA LUTRIS KENYONI) – DRAFT 
RECOVERY PLAN iii (2010), available at http://alaska.fws.gov/fisheries/mmm/sea 
otters/pdf/draft_sea_otter_recovery_plan_small_file.pdf [hereinafter DRAFT 
RECOVERY PLAN]. 
 40.  Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of 
Threatened Status for the Southwest Alaska Distinct Population Segment of the 
Northern Sea Otter (Enhydra lutris kenyoni), 70 Fed. Reg. 46,366 (Aug. 5, 2009). 
 41.  16 U.S.C. § 1371(b)(1)–(3) (2012). 
 42.  Memorandum from Alpheus Bullard, Legislative Counsel, Div. of Legal 
& Research Servs., Legislative Affairs Agency, on Establishing a Bounty on Sea 
Otters, to Sen. Bert Stedman (Dec. 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_documents.asp?session=28&docid=3436. 
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Regulations promulgated by the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration define subsistence use as “the use of 
marine mammals taken by Alaska Natives for food, clothing, shelter, 
heating, transportation, and other uses necessary to maintain the life of the 
taker or those who depend on the taker to provide them with such 
subsistence.”43 The “other use” catch-all category may allow for 
activities like those authorized by SB 60. Alaska Natives in the Southeast 
cannot exist entirely on the animals they harvest. Many low-income 
residents depend on the animals they kill for the majority of their caloric 
intake, but they still need money to buy diapers for their children, to pay 
their heating bill, or to put gas in their boats and ammunition in their 
rifles. 
The legislative history of the MMPA supports this reading of “other 
uses.” During the floor debates on the MMPA in March of 1972, Senator 
Ted Stevens said, “The Alaska Native needs cash. If he is to have the 
choice to live where his people have dwelt for centuries, he must be 
permitted to make a living there.”44 Precedent also supports this 
reading. In United States v. Clark,45 an Alaska Native was prosecuted for 
a violation of § 1371 for killing nine walruses, taking the meat from one 
but only the oosik and ivory from the others.46 Although the Ninth 
Circuit found that this particular taking was wasteful,47 the court held 
that “[g]iven the legislative history and the statutory text . . . the 
exemption is properly viewed as protecting subsistence hunting and use 
of mammal parts for a limited cash economy, so long as neither use is 
wasteful.”48 
SB 60 requires that Alaska Native hunters comply with all aspects 
of the MMPA, which means their take cannot be wasteful. The bill does 
not alter these statutory requirements in any way—it only provides an 
extra incentive to take the animals. As long as the hunter makes some 
use of the parts of the animal he takes (which in the case of sea otters is 
likely only the pelt and skull), then § 1371(b)(1) of the MMPA should not 
be a bar to SB 60.49 
Section 1371(b)(2) does not likely raise any additional issues. This 
section requires that the taking be done “for the purposes of creating 
 
 43.  50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 44.  118 CONG. REC. 840 (1972). 
 45.  912 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 46.  Id. at 1088. 
 47.  Id. at 1090. 
 48.  Id. at 1089. 
 49.  Sea otters, unlike walruses, do not have a large amount of edible meat or 
blubber. Thus, taking only the pelt and skull would likely not be deemed 
wasteful. 
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and selling authentic native articles of handicrafts and clothing.”50 The 
operative word in this clause is “purposes.” If the pelt is used to create 
some “authentic article,” no conflict between the MMPA and SB 60 
should arise. Again, receipt of the bounty requires compliance with the 
MMPA, and thus no bounty will be paid if the animal is taken for the 
sole purpose of collecting $100. The bounty merely gives the hunter 
more financial leeway in creating his “authentic native articles.” There 
would be no rush to quickly and sloppily transform the hide into a 
handicraft and bring a substandard product to market. The bounty does 
not alter the artisanal purpose for which the otter is taken; rather, it 
affords someone taking otters for this purpose a small financial cushion. 
A liberal reading of these two sections of the MMPA, when 
examined through the lens of legislative history and precedent, may 
allow for a bounty on sea otters that are otherwise taken in accordance 
with the Act. 
ii. Section 1379: Federal Preemption 
 
Section 1379 of the MMPA will most likely render SB 60 
unenforceable. Section 1379(a) provides that “[n]o State may enforce, or 
attempt to enforce, any State law or regulation relating to the taking of 
any species . . . of marine mammal within the State unless the Secretary 
has transferred authority for the conservation and management of that 
species . . . to the State.”51 “Take” is broadly defined under the MMPA as 
“to harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture or 
kill any marine mammal.”52 
Section 1379(a) has been found to preempt numerous other state 
laws even when those laws were more protective than the MMPA.53 
Thus, a law like SB 60, which incentivizes takes, would likely be found 
in conflict with the MMPA and would consequently be preempted. 
However, a potential and interesting loophole to MMPA enforcement in 
Alaska comes from a case in which local land use regulations were 
found to trump the MMPA. 
 
 50.  16 U.S.C. § 1371(b)(2) (2012). 
 51.  Id. § 1379(a). 
 52.  Id. § 1362(13). 
 53.  See UFO Chuting of Hawaii, Inc. v. Smith, 508 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(preempting regulations pertaining to how much distance a boat must keep 
between themselves and whales, later overturned by an act of Congress); Fouke 
v. Mandel, 386 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Md. 1974) (invalidating a state ban on fur 
importation); People of Togiak v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 423 (D.D.C. 1979) 
(invalidating regulations pertaining to walrus hunting). 
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a. The Arnariak Wrinkle 
 
State v. Arnariak54 held that the preemption clause of the MMPA did 
not trump local land use regulations.55 In Arnariak, Adam and Marie 
Arnariak were charged with violations of an administrative hunting 
regulation.56 This regulation, pertaining to Round Island (a part of the 
Walrus Islands Game Sanctuary), prohibited both entry onto the island 
without a permit as well as the unauthorized discharge of a firearm once 
on the island.57 The lower courts dismissed the charges on the grounds 
that the regulations were preempted by the MMPA and therefore 
invalid.58 The State appealed.59 
The Alaska Supreme Court held the MMPA was not “intended to 
preclude the State from barring entry onto state property and from 
barring the discharge of firearms on state property.”60 The court cited a 
line of takings cases and held that “[a] governmental attempt to require 
public access to private property is unconstitutional and invalid unless 
the government first follows the condemnation process and pays just 
compensation.”61 Although “relating to” when used in a preemptive 
clause is usually read broadly,62 the question of “[w]hether the phrase 
‘relating to the taking’ extends to regulations protecting marine 
mammals on state-owned land is a question which cannot be 
conclusively answered merely by reference to [§ 1379(a)].”63 According 
to the court, the answer required consideration of the legislative history 
of the MMPA, which states that the committee responsible for drafting 
the Act did not intend to “foreclose effective state programs and 
protective measures such as sanctuaries.”64 
In light of the statute’s ambiguous language and legislative history, 
the court abided by the canon that “statutes should be construed to 
avoid an unconstitutional result,”65 and held that the “clear statement 
doctrine ‘counsels that a . . . court should not apply a federal statute to 
 
 54.  941 P.2d 154 (Alaska 1997). 
 55.  Id. at 158. 
 56.  Id. at 156. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  See id. at 158 (“We are aware that Congress’s use of the phrase ‘relating 
to’ in an express preemption clause has been held to suggest a broad scale 
preemption.”). 
 63.  Id. at 157. 
 64.  Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 92-707, at 28 (1971), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4161) (emphasis omitted). 
 65.  Id. at 158. 
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an area of traditional state concern unless Congress has articulated its 
desire in clear and definite language to alter the delicate balance 
between state and federal power by application of the statute to that 
area.’”66 Because state land use regulations are a “traditional state 
function,”67 the court held that language in the MMPA was not so clear 
as to definitively express a Congressional goal of preventing the State 
from “ban[ning] certain activities in state wildlife sanctuaries.”68 
Consequently, the local regulation at issue was not preempted by the 
MMPA and the Arnariaks could be tried for their violation.69 
Justice Rabinowitz’s concurrence took a different path in reaching 
the same result. He concluded that § 1379(a) did preempt the Alaska 
regulations, but that it had “effect[ed] an uncompensated taking in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”70 
Justice Rabinowitz quoted language from the same House Report as the 
majority, which read, “[i]f U.S. activities are impaired by reason of a 
failure to own the necessary lands or interests therein, the Secretary 
must thereupon suspend the program and notify the Congress, 
recommending such additional legislation [as] is deemed necessary.”71 
In Justice Rabinowitz’s mind, “[t]his passage indicates Congress was 
aware of the Act’s possible Constitutional infirmity” and Congress was 
“unsure of whether the proposed legislation would run afoul of Fifth 
Amendment property rights,” but that Congress went ahead with the 
law anyway, leaving the issue for courts to resolve.72 Unlike the 
majority, who strained to construe the law in a manner that avoids the 
constitutional issue, Justice Rabinowitz felt “the intention of the 
Congress [was] revealed too distinctly to permit [him] to ignore it 
because of mere misgivings as to power.”73 He thus concluded that the 
MMPA contravenes the Fifth Amendment, and that “[e]ven under a 
liberal reading of the Supreme Court’s takings cases, the fact that Alaska 
permits tourists to enter Round Island to shoot pictures does not allow 
Congress to require Alaska to permit others to enter to shoot walrus.”74 
The holding and reasoning in State v. Arnariak provides a potential 
 
 66.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d 954, 966 
(Alaska 1995)). 
 67.  Id. (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 239 (1983)). 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. (Rabinowitz, J. concurring). 
 71.  Id. at 159 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 92-707, at 29 (1971), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4161). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 160 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Textile Workers Union v. 
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 478 (1957)). 
 74.  Id. 
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exception to the enforcement of the MMPA in Alaska. If the State can 
promulgate land use regulations that create a clear property right in 
Alaska Natives for the taking of sea otters, the courts may allow SB 60 to 
stand. 
b. The Navigable Waters of Alaska and Totemoff 
 
Because sea otters are a “completely marine species,”75 the question 
becomes: to what extent can Alaska govern hunting and fishing in the 
state’s navigable waters? Under Totemoff v. State,76 the answer is, in the 
absence of a clear statement to the contrary, fully.77 
In Totemoff, the Alaska Supreme Court was asked to determine 
whether the Alaska National Interest Land Conservation Act 
(“ANILCA”) preempted a state law that banned hunting with the aid of 
an artificial light.78 The hunter’s skiff at the time of the shooting was in 
navigable waters belonging to the State, while the deer he killed was on 
federal lands.79 The court found that “[e]ven if ANILCA does protect 
customary and traditional means and methods, thereby preempting 
state enforcement of the anti-spotlighting regulation against Totemoff on 
federal lands, the State still has criminal jurisdiction if ANILCA does not 
apply to the navigable waters from which Totemoff shone his spotlight 
on the deer.”80 
The court gave several reasons why navigable waters are not 
subject to ANILCA, and found that “the federal government has no 
authority based on the navigational servitude or the reserved water 
rights doctrine to regulate hunting and fishing in Alaska’s navigable 
waters.”81 The first reason given by the court was that Alaska was 
granted an “interest in fish and wildlife located in navigable waters 
which precludes federal regulation of such fish and wildlife,” under the 
Submerged Lands Act of 1953.82 That Act gave the State of Alaska 
“ownership of, title to, and management power over the following: 
lands beneath the navigable waters of Alaska, the navigable waters 
themselves, and fish and other marine life located in Alaska’s navigable 
 
 75.  DRAFT RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 39, at 19. 
  76.  905 P.2d 954 (Alaska 1995). 
 77.  See id. at 973 (“The State . . . has the power to enforce its hunting and 
fishing laws against subsistence users on federal land, so long as those laws do 
not conflict with federal laws or regulations.”). 
 78.  Id. at 957–58. 
 79.  Id. at 957. 
 80.  Id. at 961. 
 81.  Id. at 964. 
 82.  Id. 
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waters.”83 The second reason, similar to the reason employed in 
Arnariak, was rooted in the clear statement doctrine. Because states 
“have traditionally had the power to govern hunting and fishing in their 
navigable waters,” the court held that the regulation of such activities is 
a “traditional concern of the states.”84 Similar to the holding in Arnariak, 
because the Act did not have “unmistakably clear language” that 
Congress intended to shift the allocation of power between state and 
federal governments,85 the State retained criminal jurisdiction over 
Totemoff for violating state hunting regulations on state navigable 
waters.86 
II. POSSIBLE APPLICATION OF EXISTING LAW TO SB 60 
The two cases discussed above illustrate that the Alaska Supreme 
Court looks for a “clear statement” from Congress when finding that 
federal law preempts state law and regulations. In Totemoff, the court 
found that the State retained full jurisdiction over navigable waters 
because such jurisdiction had been granted to the State in the 
Submerged Lands Act and because there was no clear statement in 
ANILCA to “alter this traditional allocation of state and federal 
power.”87 Similarly in Arnariak, the court held that there was no clear 
statement in the MMPA regarding federal preemption of state land use 
regulations.88 This Section will examine and evaluate the potential legal 
arguments on both sides of the issue of whether the MMPA would 
preempt SB 60. 
A. Preempting a Mutiny 
Despite the use of the typically broadly construed phrase “relating 
to” in § 1379(a) of the MMPA, the Arnariak court refused to apply this 
preemption to state-owned lands (which the court held are treated 
similarly to privately-owned property for Fifth Amendment purposes).89 
Would an Alaska court be willing to extend this logic to the State’s 
 
 83.  Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301–56 (1988)). 
 84.  Id. at 966. 
 85.  Id. 
  86.  See id. at 968 (holding that because regulating hunting and fishing in 
navigable waters is a traditional area of the states, navigable waters are generally 
not public lands under ANILCA absent unmistakably clear language intending 
to alter the allocation of power and therefore the State had jurisdiction over 
Totemoff). 
 87.  Id. at 966. 
 88.  State v. Arnariak, 941 P.2d 154, 158 (Alaska 1997). 
 89.  Id. 
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navigable waters? After Totemoff, it seems possible but very unlikely. 
The key difference between Arnariak and SB 60 is that the 
regulation in Arnariak restricted otherwise legal activities, while SB 60 
permits otherwise illegal activities. The court in Arnariak determined 
that Congress did not intend “to preclude the State from limiting access 
to, or the discharge of firearms on, state property.”90 It is unlikely that a 
court would chose to extend Arnariak in the opposite direction; that is, 
allowing the State to permit activity on its navigable waters that is 
otherwise barred by the MMPA. 
Similarly, although “[r]egulation of hunting and fishing [in 
navigable waters] is a traditional concern of the states,”91 the right to 
allow public users of those waters to hunt on them is not a right of the 
same caliber as a private property owner’s right to exclude. Allowing 
Alaska Native hunters to take otters in accordance with SB 60 would not 
likely create the same constitutional concerns for a court that requiring 
private landowners to permit Native takes on their land would. 
There is the possibility, however slight, that a court following 
Arnariak may refuse to apply preemption, either by failing to find a 
“clear statement” that Congress intended to regulate the area of hunting 
and fishing in navigable waters, or, alternatively, by following Justice 
Rabinowitz’s logic in his Arnariak concurrence and finding that section 
1379(a) creates a taking by preventing the State from using its navigable 
waters as it sees fit. 
It is unlikely a court will act according to the first possibility and 
find no “clear statement.” The very title of the MMPA includes the 
words “marine mammal,” which, by definition, involves regulating the 
navigable waters of the states, and the phrase “relating to” in statutes 
“has been held to suggest a broad scale preemption.”92 The combination 
of these two factors weighs heavily against a court finding no  
“clear statement.” The court in Arnariak supported its no “clear 
statement” finding by holding that preemption was contrary to the 
purposes of the MMPA.93 Here, it is unclear whether a bounty on sea 
otters under SB 60 conflicts with the purposes of the MMPA:94 at least in 
the Southeast, it may not. 
As to the second possibility, in which the court finds an 
unconstitutional taking, this too does not seem to be a likely outcome. In 
 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d 954, 966 (Alaska 1995). 
 92.  Arnariak, 941 P.2d at 158 (discussing the statutory language). 
 93.  Id. at 157–58. 
 94.  See id. at 157 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 92-707, at 11 (1971), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4144) (“The purpose of this legislation is to prohibit the 
harassing, catching and killing of marine mammals.”). 
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the Arnariak decision, the court held that the state regulation was not 
preempted by the MMPA in order to avoid an unconstitutional taking.95 
The bounty established by SB 60 should not present the same problem 
because SB 60 would not create a property right, which is required to 
show a Fifth Amendment taking.96 Within the framework of Kaiser Aetna 
v. United States,97 a bounty is probably not an “expectanc[y] embodied in 
the concept of ‘property’” sufficiently important to require the 
government to condemn it and provide compensation.98  
Because there is no property right at issue here, it is very unlikely 
that a court would agree with Justice Rabinowitz and find that the 
MMPA as applied to a sea otter bounty is an unconstitutional taking. SB 
60, as currently written, would thus likely be preempted and 
invalidated. 
B. Paying the Bounty 
While a court would probably not find the same constitutional 
concerns with SB 60 as with the regulation in Arnariak, there are some 
similar arguments that support the bill’s legality. Just as “the regulation 
of state lands is a traditional state function,”99 so too have states 
“traditionally had the power to govern hunting and fishing in their 
navigable waters.”100 Because the Arnariak court found that, despite 
evidence to the contrary, “Congress has not manifested in the MMPA in 
clear and definite language a desire to displace the State’s ability to ban 
certain activities in state wildlife sanctuaries,”101 another Alaska court 
might find the same lack of “clear and definite language”102 regarding 
bounty regulation on the State’s navigable waters. The typically broad 
preemption found in the phrase “relating to” has been limited by 
Arnariak and does not apply to local land use regulations in Alaska.103 A 
court might be willing to extend that logic to regulations pertaining to 
navigable waters. While “[t]he power to regulate commerce 
comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the extent necessary, 
 
 95.  See id. at 158 (holding that the MMPA did not preempt the state 
regulation and the constitutional issue need not be decided). 
 96.  See United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945) 
(holding that the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment only requires 
compensation when private property is taken for public use). 
 97.  444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
 98.  Id. at 179–80. 
 99.  Arnariak, 941 P.2d at 158. 
 100.  Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d 954, 966 (Alaska 1995). 
 101.  Arnariak, 941 P.2d at 158. 
  102.  Id. (quoting Totemoff, 905 P.2d at 966). 
 103.  Id. 
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of all the navigable water of the United States,”104 the power to regulate 
navigation only “confers upon the United States a dominant 
servitude.”105 Similar to the issue in Totemoff, where the court found 
fishing and hunting in navigable waters to be a traditional domain of the 
states, a court reviewing SB 60 might find that the MMPA lacks the 
requisite “unmistakably clear language” that would lead the court to 
“alter this traditional allocation of state and federal power.”106 
Delving deeper into the purpose of the MMPA potentially provides 
some support for the sea otter bounty. The purpose of the MMPA is 
articulated within the Act itself: “the primary objective . . . should be to 
maintain the health and stability of the marine ecosystem. Whenever 
consistent with this primary objective, it should be the goal to obtain an 
optimum sustainable population keeping in mind the carrying capacity of 
the habitat.”107 Optimum sustainable population is defined as “the 
number of animals which will result in the maximum productivity of the 
population of the species, keeping in mind the carrying capacity of the 
habitat and the health of the ecosystem of which they form a constituent 
element.”108 The current rate of sea otter population growth is as high as 
12–14% per year in Southeast Alaska.109 This growth has already had 
drastic, negative impacts on the surrounding marine ecosystem.110 
Numerous other marine species have become depleted to the point 
where their commercial harvest is no longer allowed, and this has 
resulted in millions of dollars of lost revenues.111  
The bounty established by SB 60 could actually improve the health 
of the ecosystem by limiting the amount of otters in the area preying on 
other species and in turn leading to greater biodiversity. In managing 
marine mammals, one must keep in mind “the carrying capacity of the 
habitat and the health of the ecosystem.”112 A bounty on sea otters in 
Southeast Alaska, which would regulate a population that is growing at 
an incredible rate and is contributing to the degradation of the health of 
the ecosystem, might not be at odds with the MMPA’s purpose. 
As mentioned previously, the legislative history of the MMPA 
might support a court’s finding that the bounty is valid under § 1371. 
 
 104.  United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 122–23 (1967) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 105.  Id. at 123 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 106.  Totemoff, 905 P.2d at 966. 
 107.  16 U.S.C. § 1361(6) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 108.  Id. § 1362(9) (emphasis added). 
 109.  SPONSOR STATEMENT, supra note 3. 
 110.  MCDOWELL REPORT, supra note 22, at 1–4, 15. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  16 U.S.C. § 1362(9). 
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Senator Stevens expressly stated during the Senate debate on the MMPA 
that “the Alaska Native needs cash.”113 Since Senator Stevens made that 
point in 1972, the Alaska Native’s need for cash has only become more 
pronounced. While it may no longer be the case that “the only industry 
that the Alaska Native can count on to support himself and his family is 
one based upon full utilization of the ocean mammals,”114 the ocean 
mammal industry is still an important one. Just as “snowmobiles have 
largely replaced dog sleds,”115 cash has long since replaced barter and 
trade between individual Alaska Natives. SB 60 therefore comports with 
Senator Stevens’ original vision for the Native exemption to the MMPA 
by providing a means for Alaska Natives to earn cash.  
CONCLUSION 
While Arnariak provides an interesting loophole to MMPA 
enforcement in Alaska, SB 60 does not manage to squeeze through it. In 
order to circumvent the MMPA, a bill would have to create some form 
of property right in sea otters for Alaska Natives, which SB 60 currently 
does not. The language of the bill is too broad, and its enforcement 
would almost certainly be in conflict with § 1379(a) of the MMPA. 
If Senator Stedman were to revise the bill to create a property right 
in sea otters, the Alaska Supreme Court might be willing to extend 
Arnariak and either construe the MMPA as not preempting state law, or, 
follow Justice Rabinowitz’s logic and hold that the MMPA is 
unconstitutional in this situation. Wording the bill in a way that creates a 
property right would be incredibly difficult, as courts have held that 
there is no right in assigned fishing quotas,116 and thus it is likely that 
effective management of Southeast Alaska’s sea otter population will 
ultimately need to take another path.  
 
 
 113.  118 CONG. REC. 8401 (1972) (statement of Sen. Ted Stevens). 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  See, e.g., Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1383 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that a fishing vessel’s owner did not have the right to 
fish for mackerel in the United States Exclusive Economic Zone). 
